Here you'll find the latest verified inteligence on the uprising in Sudan. Join the rebellion by adding comments, thoughts and ideas.
|Posted by sudanprotests on May 16, 2014 at 4:40 AM||comments (0)|
KHARTOUM Thu May 15, 2014
A Sudanese court has sentenced a heavily pregnant Christian woman to death by hanging and 100 lashes after convicting her on charges of apostasy and adultery.
A Khartoum court handed down the sentence on Thursday morning (local time) after 27-year-old Meriam Yehya Ibrahim refused to recant her faith.
Ibrahim, who is eight months pregnant with her second child, was convicted of adultery and apostasy on 11 May and given three days by the court to renounce her religion.
Amnesty International said Ibrahim was arrested and charged with adultery in August 2013 after a family member reportedly claimed that she was committing adultery because of her marriage to a Christian South Sudanese man.
Under Sudan’s Islamic Shari’a law, a Muslim woman is not permitted to marry a non-Muslim man, thus any such marriage is considered adulterous. The court later added the charge of apostasy when Ibrahim, who was raised an Orthodox Christian, asserted that she was not a Muslim.
Amnesty International has described the sentence as “truly abhorrent”.
It said Ibrahim is a prisoner of conscience, convicted solely because of her religious beliefs and identity and should be released immediately.
“The fact that a woman has been sentenced to death for her religious choice, and to flogging for being married to a man of an allegedly different religion is appalling and abhorrent,” Manar Idriss, Amnesty International’s Sudan researcher, said in a statement following the sentencing.
“Adultery and apostasy are acts which should not be considered crimes at all. It is flagrant breach of international human rights law,” he added.
According to the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA), Ibrahim was born in Gedarif state, and raised solely by her Christian Ethiopian Orthodox mother as her Muslim Sudanese father was entirely absent from her upbringing.
In 2012, she married Dr Daniel Wani, a South Sudanese born US citizen, in Khartoum, with whom she has a 20-month-year-old son.
SIHA said it had been informed by Ibrahim’s legal consul that the US embassy in Khartoum has so far been unable to arrange a DNA test, required to support her husband’s claim for custody of their son, who is currently incarcerated with his mother.
It remains unclear what support options will be available to the US embassy for the family even in the event that a DNA test demonstrates the paternity of the child, as Sudanese authorities are likely to refuse the father’s claim for custody given he is not a Muslim.
EU representatives in Khartoum said they had been following the case closely due to its implications for human rights and religious tolerance in the country.
In a brief statement on Tuesday, European diplomats underlined Sudan’s obligation under international law to defend and promote the freedom of religion.
The US, UK, Canadian and Dutch embassies in Khartoum also issued a joint statement prior to Ibrahim’s sentencing expressing their deep concern over the court’s ruling and calling for compassion.
However, according to SIHA said Sudan’s legal system has a history of singling out women, ethnic minorities and activists with punishments often disproportionate to the alleged crimes committed.
“The fact that Meriam stands to lose her life over specious charges makes this case of utmost urgency and demands a unified advocacy and outreach efforts by human rights defenders across the globe,” it said.
While Amnesty has documented a number of cases in recent years of flogging sentences carried out in Sudan, there have been no known executions for apostasy since the 1991 Sudanese Criminal Code was enacted, although many have had their charges dropped or convictions overturned after recanting their faith.
Sudan’s judicial system came under scrutiny earlier this year after an 18-year-old Ethiopian woman, who was gang raped by seven men in Omdurman when she was three months pregnant, was charged with adultery and prostitution.
|Posted by sudanprotests on May 13, 2014 at 10:00 PM||comments (0)|
ZAMZAM Tue May 12, 2014
Unicef, the Network for the Protection of Children of the Zamzam camp for the displaced in North Darfur, and organisations working in the field of children’s rights, have demanded the immediate release of Mohamed Ibrahim Abdel Rahman Juma (15), detained by the security apparatus in Khartoum since 26 April.
“Juma is a student of the Abdallah Nafi Basic School at the Zamzam camp,” a member of the Zamzam camp network told Radio Dabanga. “After he successfully completed the seventh year, he travelled with his uncle, Mohamed Ahmed (21), to Khartoum to search for work there during the school holiday.”
The network member explained that Juma and his uncle were arrested by security forces, immediately after they arrived at the El Obeid bus station in Khartoum. “They were transported to a security office in Khartoum. After three days, the uncle was brought back to El Obeid bus station in a vehicle with tinted windows.”
The uncle told his family that he has not seen or heard from his nephew since the day they were captured. They were detained in separate cells.
Photo: Basic school classroom in Kabkabiya, North Darfur, built by Unamid forces (Albert González Farran/Unamid)
|Posted by sudanprotests on May 13, 2014 at 9:20 PM||comments (0)|
Violence at University of Khartoum in Sudan continues, Chancellor resigns
KHARTOUM 12 May
The Chancellor of the University of Khartoum has resigned in protest against the government's non-cooperation in containing the violence between students at the campuses. The teaching staff has requested a temporary closure of the University. Students will boycott the coming exams.
The chairman of the University’s Initiative Committee, Dr Abdel Rahim Karar announced on Sunday that the Chancellor Prof Siddig Hayati has offered his resignation last week in protest against continuing assaults on activist students at the hands of militant students backed by the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), and the silence of the government.
The University’s teaching staff has accused militant Islamists among the students of launching attacks at the campus, and terrorising the other students. The staff said that the police have admitted their incapability of stopping the militants. The lecturers have therefore requested the Council of Deans to close all compounds and faculties until the crisis is resolved.
Member of the Students’ Committee, Awad Abdeen, told Radio Dabanga that the students will boycott the examinations of June, because many courses have not been completed due to the suspension of lectures for some weeks in March and April, and some students were injured in the assaults.
Clashes between students and militants have intensified the last weeks. The militants are reacting violently to the students’ demands for a thorough investigation into the killing of a Darfuri student during a peaceful demonstration at the University of Khartoum's main campus on 11 March, and the removal of security forces stationed at the university gates and the campus.
File photo: University of Khartoum students demonstrating on 11 March 2014 (Radio Dabanga)
|Posted by sudanprotests on May 5, 2014 at 6:05 PM||comments (0)|
(Reuters) - Riot police fired tear gas at dozens of Sudanese students protesting against President Omar Hassan al-Bashir on Monday, witnesses said.
The protest outside the University of Khartoum was prompted by clashes between student supporters and opponents of Bashir. One student died in March during a similar protest at which the police used tear gas and batons.
Islamist leader Bashir has stayed in power for over two decades despite armed rebellions, U.S. trade sanctions, an economic crisis, an attempted coup and an indictment from the International Criminal Court on charges of masterminding war crimes in the troubled region of Darfur.
The students chanted "our university will always be free," and "no, no to the merchants of religion," during their demonstration, which was dispersed within minutes by the security forces.
The protest was one of several organized by the Khartoum University students since March. It was the first since the university's resumption two weeks ago of classes which were suspended after the March protests.
Bashir's regime faces a deteriorating economy with a sharp drop in oil revenues, the main source of government income, and rising inflation after losing most of his active oilfields with the secession of South Sudan in 2011.
His government's decision to cut subsidies and take other austerity measures last September prompted the worst wave of street protests in years, leaving dozens dead and hundreds jailed.
(Reporting by Khalid Abdel Aziz; Writing by Yasmine Saleh; Editing by Andrew Roche)
|Posted by sudanprotests on December 30, 2012 at 2:45 PM||comments (0)|
KHARTOUM: Sudanese security forces on Sunday blocked activists trying to deliver a petition criticising the government to the country's human rights commission, drawing a rare rebuke from the state-appointed body.
Sudan has avoided mass "Arab Spring" protests that unseated rulers in Egypt and Tunisia, but President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, who seized power in 1989, has faced dissent over a severe economic crisis and corruption.
Before the activists arrived, police and plain clothed security agents, some armed with batons, pulled up in cars and spread out at the front gate to bar entry to the commission, witnesses said.
"Plain clothed agents beat several activists trying to submit their petition and also journalists covering the protest," a witness told Reuters. Policemen also grabbed placards held up by the protesters.
Around 40 human rights activists had called for the protest at the Human Rights Commission in Khartoum to criticise the government for what they called obstruction of the work of civil society.
Staff at the commission, whose head was appointed by Bashir, came out of the building to ask police to let the activists deliver their letter, but police refused.
The commission, which rarely criticises the government, condemned the breakup as an "attack" on the commission.
"The commission rejects this behaviour. It is a clear violation of the constitution ... and the law regulating the Human Rights Commission," it said in a statement.
"This will be also considered as attack on the inviolability of the commission and its immunity."
The security forces were not immediately available to comment.
Sudanese police fired teargas on university students in early December after four days of protests which followed the death of four students from Darfur.
The demonstrations were the most sustained to hit Sudan after a wave of protests against government austerity measures in June.
|Posted by sudanprotests on December 27, 2012 at 7:35 PM||comments (0)|
Why Does Khartoum Pursue Policies so Destructive of the Economy?
By Eric Reeves, a professor at Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts
Despite the already acute and growing danger of complete economic implosion, the regime persists with immensely expensive and unproductive policies, including war in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile, as well as hostile actions along the North/South border, and the supplying of renegade militia groups inside South Sudan. For a regime that is ruthlessly survivalist, this makes no rational sense: current economic realities are diminishing the chances that the regime will survive. So why is it persisting in policies and actions that work against a resumption of transit fees for oil originating in South Sudan and passing through the northern pipeline to Port Sudan? Why is the regime creating a situation in which the generous transit fees that Juba is willing to pay have been forgone? This seems even more peculiar, given the grasping nature of Khartoum's greed, revealed earlier this year when Southern engineers discovered a covert tie-in line to main oil pipeline, capable of diverting some 120,000 bpd of Southern crude. This subterfuge has not been forgotten by the South, and only makes more exigent the question: why has Khartoum put oil transit revenues in jeopardy?
At full capacity—350,000 bpd—these pipeline revenues could do a great deal to close the yawning budget gap that Khartoum faces; and this is on top of Juba's agreement to assist Khartoum financially during a difficult transition and also to allow the regime to keep the more more than $800 million sequestered during the stand-off over transit fees (the amount of oil was peremptorily calculated by Khartoum on the basis of its outrageous $36/barrel fee proposal). What keeps Khartoum from finalizing the deal on oil transport, thereby creating further doubts in the minds of Southerners that this pipeline will remain a viable means of export? Why does Khartoum continue to wage a brutal economic war of attrition against South Sudan, which should be its largest and most important trading partner? The reality of lost oil income is inescapable:
"Prior to [the secession of South Sudan], about three-quarters of crude production came from the south and accounted for more than 85 percent of Khartoum's export earnings, which reached $7.5 billion in the first half of 2011, according to the World Bank. 'They've lost that (oil) income. It's gone for good,' an international economist said, declining to be identified." (Agence France-Presse [Khartoum], February 26, 2012)
Here again the common distinction between "moderates" and "hardliners" is better understood as referring to differences within a regime that is at various times more and less pragmatic, or at least has very different views of what is "pragmatic." Ali Osman Taha, for example, is often cited as a "moderate" because of his central role in the Naivasha peace talks; it is rarely remarked that in February 2004, a year before those talks would culminate in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Talks, Taha left Naivasha to "address the Darfur crisis." As anyone who followed the course of events through 2004 and into 2005 knows, this was the period marked by the very height of genocidal violence and destruction. An October 24, 2004 report from the U.S. Congressional Research Service notes:
"In February 2004, First Vice President Ali Osman Taha, the government [of Sudan's] chief negotiator [in Naivasha], told the mediators that he had to leave the talks to deal with the Darfur problem. In February 2004, the government of Sudan initiated a major military campaign against the Sudan Liberation Army and Justice and Equality Movement and declared victory by the end of the month. Attacks by government forces and the Janjaweed militia against civilians intensified between February and June 2004, forcing tens of thousands of civilians to flee to neighboring Chad."
As we know now, many tens of thousands of people were also killed by the violence of this period, and the killing continued long after Taha's intervention, with total mortality now in the range of 500,000. The number of internally displaced persons would, according to the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, grow to 2.7 million. The UN High Commission for Refugees estimates that more than 280,000 Darfuris remain in eastern Chad as refugees. That Taha the "moderate" played such a central role in the Darfur genocide is far too infrequently acknowledged, suggesting again that within the NIF/NCP "pragmatism" may take many forms.
After much shifting in language and positions, Khartoum would now have the world believe that it will uphold the agreement on oil transport only if Juba agrees to various "security arrangements." But of course just what these arrangements are keeps changing, even as Khartoum ignores the most fundamental requirement for security in both Sudan and South Sudan: a fully delineated and authoritatively demarcated border. This of course should have been achieved in the "interim period" of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (January 9, 2005 to July 9, 2011). That it was not is almost entirely the fault of Khartoum, which evidently thought—and still thinks—it can extort borderlands from the South and incorporate them into Sudan. The military seizure of Abyei (May 2011) was simply the opening salvo. Military ambitions may in fact extend to seizing more Southern oil fields and arable land.
More recently, Khartoum's demanded "security arrangements" have come to include Juba's disarming of the Sudan People's Liberation Army-North, an utterly preposterous notion—indeed, so preposterous that it must be viewed as a means of stalling negotiations. In this respect it is very similar to Khartoum's initial proposal of a US$36/barrel transit fee proposal during negotiations on that issue: this was not an opening gambit, not a serious proposal from which compromise could be reached. It was meant to halt negotiations and indeed resulted in Juba's decision to shut down oil production altogether.
So, too, the current "security arrangements" proposal is meant to put a hold on negotiations by demanding what the South cannot possibly offer or provide, even as senior officials in Khartoum continue to insist that they will not negotiate with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North, insisting that the "alliance" between Juba and the SPLM/A-N must first be ended. And yet no evidence of substance is offered to suggest any military alliance. We may understand why the NIF/NCP wishes the army of South Sudan to disarm northern rebels, primarily in the Nuba: Abdel Aziz al-Hilu's forces are manhandling SAF troops and militias, chewing up entire battalions and parts of some brigades and in the process acquiring a great deal of ammunition, weaponry, fuel, and other supplies (despite this, Ahmed Haroun—indicted war criminal and governor of South Kordofan—insists that the SAF will achieve victory soon). But does anyone living in the real world think that Juba will help to disarm the SPLA-North? These are former comrades in arms, deeply connected by the years of suffering and fighting together, and by a deep mutual suspicion of Khartoum. In the absence of any substantial evidence that Juba is aiding the rebels in the Nuba in a significant way, we must conclude that something else is going on here.
It is important to remember that while the regime has been in power for 23 years, individual members and factions of this regime have relentlessly jockeyed for power, often ruthlessly pursuing their own interests, and have found themselves on occasion in significant ascendancy or decline. The most recent example appears to be Salah Abdallah "Gosh," once head of the extremely powerful National Intelligence and Security Services; further back, we have the sharp split between al-Bashir's cabal and Islamic ideological leader Hassan al-Turabi in the late 1990s. But ambition within the regime's central cabal has never, in any quarter, been "moderated" by a desire to do what is best for the people of Sudan.
The most notable recent ascendancy is that of key senior military officials in decision-making about war and peace; this too has gone insufficiently remarked, despite very considerable evidence that on a range of issues, military views have prevailed. The nature of this ascendancy, and the motives behind it, were first emphasized by Sudan researcher Julie Flint in an important account from in August 2011, based on an extraordinary interview with an official in Khartoum. The official, whose account has been corroborated by other sources, warned that a silent military coup was already well under way in Khartoum before the seizure of Abyei (May 2011). There seems little doubt that if this official's account is accurate, and there has in fact been a successful military coup from within, then there will be very little room for civilians in the new configuration of power when it comes to issues of war and peace:
"[A] well-informed source close to the National Congress Party reports that Sudan's two most powerful generals went to [Sudanese President Omar al-] Bashir on May 5, five days after 11 soldiers were killed in an SPLA ambush in Abyei, on South Kordofan’s southwestern border, and demanded powers to act as they sought fit, without reference to the political leadership."
"'They got it,' the source says. 'It is the hour of the soldiers—a vengeful, bitter attitude of defending one’s interests no matter what; a punitive and emotional approach that goes beyond calculation of self-interest. The army was the first to accept that Sudan would be partitioned. But they also felt it as a humiliation, primarily because they were withdrawing from territory in which they had not been defeated. They were ready to go along with the politicians as long as the politicians were delivering—but they had come to the conclusion they weren't. Ambushes in Abyei…interminable talks in Doha keeping Darfur as an open wound…. Lack of agreement on oil revenue….' 'It has gone beyond politics,' says one of Bashir’s closest aides. 'It is about dignity.'"
How well borne out by subsequent developments is this assessment?
When the senior and quite powerful presidential advisor Nafie Ali Nafie signed on June 28, 2011 a "Framework Agreement" with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North, it seemed for a moment in which war in the Nuba and Blue Nile might be averted. Three days later President al-Bashir emphatically renounced the breakthrough agreement, declaring after Friday prayers (July 1, 2011) that the "cleansing" of the Nuba Mountains would continue. This was clearly a declaration made at the behest of the generals, specifically Major General Mahjoub Abdallah Sharfi—head of Military Intelligence—and Lt. Gen. Ismat Abdel Rahman al-Zain— implicated in Darfur atrocity crimes because of his role as SAF director of military operations, he is identified in the “Confidential Annex” to the report by the UN panel of Experts on Darfur (Annex leaked in February 2006).
These men and their military colleagues are the ones whose actions have ensured that Abyei will remain a deeply contentious issue in growing tensions between Sudan and South Sudan; certainly they knew full well the implications of taking military action in Abyei—military action that directly contravened the Abyei Protocol of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. This action ensures that Abyei will continue to fester and may yet lead to confrontation if—as is likely—both the African Union and the UN Secretariat and Security Council continue to temporize over the AU proposal on the permanent status of Abyei, a proposal subsequently endorsed by the AU Peace and Security Council but rejected by Khartoum. And as long as Abyei festers, negotiations over other issues are made gratuitously more difficult, and it becomes ever less likely that sustained oil transit revenues from use of the northern pipeline will resume. After losing almost a year's worth of oil revenue, the South will certainly proceed with plans for an alternative export route. Khartoum's sequestration of almost a billion dollars of oil revenues due to the South since independence (July 9, 2011) left Juba feeling deeply uneasy about any viable long-term arrangement with the current regime, despite the decision to allow Khartoum to keep the oil revenues it had illegally sequestered.
From the standpoint of a rational management of the economy, the military decisions made have been consistently disastrous. This is true whether we are speaking of genocidal destruction (and economic collapse) in Darfur; renewed genocide in the Nuba Mountains, which has prompted a ferociously successful rebel military response; massive civilian destruction and displacement in Blue Nile; the military seizure of Abyei; the extremely ill-considered assaults on forces of the SPLA-South in the Tishwin area of Unity State in March/April of this year; support for renegade militia groups in South Sudan; the growing assertion of unreasonable claims about the North/South border; and the repeated bombings along the border over the past year and a half, including the "Mile 14" area of Northern Bahr el-Ghazal. This is an extraordinary catalog of offensive military actions. And none of them reflects a concern for economic problems that may well bring down the regime. On the contrary, these decisions represent a bitter, vengeful desire to "get even" with South Sudan for exercising its right to self-determination. But vengeance will not rescue the failing northern economy, and absent the resumption of oil transport income, the economy will continue in free-fall, with hyper-inflation daily more likely. Normal corrective measures in economic policy are impossible in the context of current military commitments; corrections that would in any event have been highly challenging in light of the precipitous cut-off of oil revenue are now unavailable.
So long as decisions about war and peace are being made in Khartoum by the generals, without regard for the effects of continuing and renewed fighting on the broader economy, Sudan will remain both brutally violent and ultimately untenable under present governance.
The one decision the international community, and Paris Club members in particular, should make is not to engage in any discussions of or planning for debt relief for Khartoum until the regime disengages from all military campaigns that target civilians, and ceases military actions so indiscriminate as to ensure widespread civilian destruction such as we have seen most recently in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, previously in Abyei, and for very nearly ten years in Darfur. The international banking system as well as international financing resources should do nothing that will convince Khartoum it may escape paying a heavy price for its continuing atrocities in these regions. For its part, the regime continues to speak confidently about its prospects for international debt relief. It's hard to know whether this proceeds from expediency—even the artificial prospect of partial debt relief would help the northern economy immensely—or cynicism: the international community has capitulated before Khartoum's demands, has accepted the validity of its commitment to signed agreements, on so many occasions that the regime may calculate it will prevail yet again.
This must not happen. The international community has failed greater Sudan for too many years now, has accommodated a murderous, finally genocidal regime in Khartoum since June 1989, and now is a moment for moral clarity and principled decision: will the world fund this regime? Will it accept massive atrocity crimes in Sudan in the interest of something other than the well-being of the Sudanese people themselves?
Civil society in those countries most significantly represented in the Paris Club should lobby their governments to state publicly that the unqualified priority in Sudan policy is ending civilian destruction throughout greater Sudan. Unequivocal evidence that this "priority" obtains in national policies must be demanded. As presumptuous as this may seem to some, it is what vast numbers of people from greater Sudan wish, as do many well-informed friends of the region.
It is a simple "ask": no debt relief for a regime that continues to commit atrocity crimes against civilians on a wide scale. This debt was accrued in large measure by profligate military expenditures on weapons that are even now being deployed against hundreds of thousands of noncombatant civilians. Yet as simple and apparently reasonable as such an "ask" is, there are very good historical reasons to believe that it will be refused; rather, some factitious "occasion" will be found to provide Khartoum with a financial life-line—a decision defined by its expediency, not its moral intelligibility. There could be no more irresponsible use of international economic and financial resources. Read Part 1
|Posted by sudanprotests on April 27, 2012 at 10:20 PM||comments (0)|
April 26, 2012 (KHARTOUM) – Sudanese authorities have impounded more than 60 vehicles carrying food across the borders to South Sudan, an official said on Thursday, warning that Khartoum intends to rigidly enforce a ban on smuggling to the southern neighbor.
Last week Sudan announced plans to declare a state of emergency in areas bordering South Sudan and fight food smuggling to its former southern territory that became an independent state in July last year.
The move comes amid unprecedented levels of tension between the two neighbors since South Sudan briefly occupied two weeks ago the disputed region of Heglig which supplies Khartoum with half of its daily oil output.
The Sudanese justice minister, Mohammed Boshara Dosa, visited White Nile State where he inspected more than 60 trucks impounded by local authorities as they carried food and petro items across the borders.
Dosa said that the seizure is meant to signal the fact that Khartoum considers smuggling of food to South Sudan as “a crime tantamount to supplying the enemy with arms”.
Dosa further warned that law-enforcement authorities would crackdown take all necessary measures to ensure that smuggling is prevented.
He also instructed the authorities to bring those who were caught smuggling food to trial.
Sudanese first Vice-President Ali Osman Mohammad Taha asked the parliament last week to amend laws in order to allow execution of anyone found guilty of smuggling food to South Sudan.
|Posted by sudanprotests on April 13, 2012 at 8:40 AM||comments (0)|
April 12, 2012 (KHARTOUM) – The Sudanese Central Commission for Students’ Political Organizations kicked off a mobilisation and recruitment campaign to send fighters to the border state of South Kordofan where the Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA) of South Sudan took over the oil-rich region of Heglig on Tuesday.
The Sudanese government vowed to reclaim the area amid widespread condemnation by the international community to Juba’s move.
The commission suggested that they will not allow "pro-rebel" groups at the universities from holding any political events inside the schools.
The body accused Darfur rebels and the opposition Popular Congress Party (PCP) led by Hassan al-Turabi of supporting and celebrating the attack on Heglig.
Habib Mahfouz, the commission head, said that they will work to expose the "traitors" who are working for a regime change by publishing their names and plots.
He disclosed that they handed over a letter of complaint to the United Nations, United States embassy, African Union (AU) and European Union (EU).
Mahfouz said that the attack on Heglig is an aggressive approach from South Sudan which aims to kill Sudan morally as well as on the ground.
|Posted by sudanprotests on March 7, 2012 at 2:35 PM||comments (0)|
March 6, 2012 (KHARTOUM) – Two protests broke out in the Sudanese capital Khartoum on Tuesday after a woman was killed by police. Watch video's of the event.
Photo of the protest in Al-Deim area in central Khartoum over the killing of Awadia Agabna by the Public Order Police (ST)
The victim Awadia Agabna was shot dead the day before outside her house in Al-Deim area in central Khartoum by members of the Public Order Police (POP) following a scuffle between them and her brother who they accused of being drunk, eye witnesses told Sudan Tribune.
The victim’s mother was also injured in the clashes, they said.
The incident sparked strong protests the following day in Al-Deim and some parts of Al-Sahafah area where angry demonstrators attacked POP stations. Police forces used teargas and batons to break up the demonstrations.
A statement released by the police on Tuesday claimed that their forces were “assaulted” by members of the victim’s family who tried to seize the police arms, which prompted the commander of the force to “fire three shots in the air.”
The police’s statement said that a committee would be formed to investigate the incident.
Sudan Tribune has learned that local newspapers received direct orders from the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) not to report on the incident.
|Posted by sudanprotests on January 27, 2012 at 4:40 AM||comments (0)|
January 26, 2012 (KHARTOUM) – The violent events in South Darfur State escalated on Thursday with two people being killed as demonstration against the newly appointed governor entered its third day.
Meanwhile, the federal government in Khartoum has vowed to stamp out the unrest, describing as outlaws those protesting in favour of reinstating the former governor.
South Darfur State plunged into anepisode of unrest on Tuesday when supporters of ex-governor Abdul Hamid Musa Kasha staged protests against the appointment of his successor, Ismail Hamad, as the latter arrived in the state capital Nyala to assume his duties.
Hamad was appointed to his position on 10 January as Kasha, the governor elected during the 2010 general elections, was relieved from his position as part of presidential decrees that increased the number of states in Sudan’s western region of Darfur from three to five.
The decrees are part of the implementation of the Doha Peace Agreement signed in mid July last year between the government and the Liberation and Justice Movement, one of Darfur rebel groups, in a bid to end the nine years of conflict in the region.
Kasha was given the position of the governor of the newly created state of East Darfur, but he refused to accept his post, citing dissatisfaction with the area’s lack of infrastructure.
The first two days of unrest in Nyala saw looting, arson and the death of three people as the police clamped down on the protesters.
Eye witnesses told Sudan Tribune that demonstrators took to the streets again on Thursday and gathered in main down town markets where they burned tires. The police resorted to its typical response of firing tear gas and live bullets in the air to break them up.
According to the witnesses, two more people were killed and dozens were injured.
Meanwhile, the state minister for the presidency of the republic, Amin Hassan Omer, told the Khartoum-based daily newspaper Al-Ahdath on Friday that the authorities are determined to confront outlaws without leniency.
“There will be no immunity to those who break the law,” he declared, stressing that there is no going back in the appointment of the new governor.
Omer also absolved the former governor Kasha of any guilt, saying he had nothing to do with the unrest.
But Omer’s assertion makes little sense in view of statements on Thursday in which the new governor Hamad accused Kasha loyalists in the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) of standing behind the unrest.
“If this crisis did not erupt, we would not have been able to glean the sources of error in the party,” Hamad told a gathering of NCP members in Nyala.
The new governor called on the NCP’s youth to renounce violence, and pledged to continue the achievements of his predecessor.
In the meantime, the NCP has scrambled to contain the situation, forming a taskforce led by its prominent member Ibrahim Ahmad Omer and other members who arrived in Nyala on Thursday.
The delegation immediately embarked on a series of meetings with the state’s security committee as well as local officials, including Kasha.
On the other hand, NCP members loyal to Kasha gathered at the party’s headquarters in Nyala and chanted slogans calling for his return to the governor office.
The NCP’s delegation met with Kasha’s stalwarts and urged them to observe self-restrain.
Analysts say that Darfur states governors who belong to the NCP are unhappy with the Doha Agreement on the perception that it detracts from their powers.
Analysts are also sceptical that the Doha agreement will bring an end to the conflict in the region, considering the power struggles that might derail its implementation.